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Nonlinear Effects of Taxation on Growth
Nir Jaimovich
University of Southern California and National Bureau of Economic Research
Sergio Rebelo
Northwestern University, National Bureau of Economic Research,
and Centre for Economic Policy Research
We propose a model consistent with two observations. First, the tax
rates adopted by different countries are generally uncorrelated with
their growth performance. Second, countries that drastically reduce
private incentives to invest severely hurt their growth performance.
In our model, the effects of taxation on growth are highly nonlinear.
Low tax rates have a very small impact on long-run growth rates. But as
tax rates rise, their negative impact on growth rises dramatically. The
median voter chooses tax rates that have a small impact on growth
prospects, making the relation between tax rates and economic growth
difficult to measure empirically.
I. Introduction
The twentieth century provided two important observations on the de-
terminants of long-run growth. The first observation is that the tax rates
adopted by different countries are generally uncorrelated with their
growth performance. So, are incentives to invest irrelevant for long-run
growth?
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The second observation is that countries that drastically reduce private
incentives to innovate and invest severely hurt their growth performance.
One salient example is the performance of China between 1949, when
communists took over and abolished property rights, and the introduc-
tion of reforms by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Another prominent example
is the performance of India under the “permit raj” that lasted from 1947
until the reforms introduced by Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao in 1984
and 1991, respectively. Interestingly, when these countries gradually re-
stored modest incentives to invest, growth rates increased dramatically.1
Here, incentives to invest seem to matter for growth.
To reconcile these two observations, we propose a model in which the
effects of taxation on growth are highly nonlinear. Low or moderate tax
rates have a small impact on long-run growth rates. But as tax rates and
other disincentives to investment rise, their negative impact on growth
rises dramatically.
To explain the source of this nonlinearity, it is useful to describe the
structure of our model. We combine the growthmodel proposed by Romer
(1990) with the Lucas (1978) model of occupational choice. As in Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992),
growth comes from innovation. As in Lucas (1978), the economy is popu-
lated by agents who differ in their ability as entrepreneurs/innovators.
These agents decide optimally whether to become workers or innova-
tors. Innovators earn profits from their patents, and these profits are
subject to capital income taxation.
Motivated by the plethora of evidence on the presence of right skew-
ness in the distribution of patents, scientific paper citations, income, and
profits, we assume that the distribution of entrepreneurial ability is skewed.
Because of this skewness, most of the innovation in our economy comes
from a small number of highly productive innovators, the Bill Gates and
Steve Jobs of the model.
Increasing the capital income tax rate reduces incentives to be an en-
trepreneur and generates exit from the innovation sector. But since the
marginal innovator is much less productive than the average innovator,
this exit has a small impact on the growth performance of the economy.
In other words, the top entrepreneurs in our model are so productive
1 Ahluwalia (2002) discusses the gradualist approach to reform followed by India. Mc-
Millan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989) and McMillan and Naughton (1992) discuss the gradual
reforms introduced in China and their impact on productivity. In China and India, re-
forms took place in an environment of political and institutional stability. In contrast,
countries from the ex-Soviet bloc often adopted a “big-bang” approach to reform that cre-
ated substantial political and institutional turmoil that was generally associated with poor
economic performance. See McMillan and Naughton (1992) for a comparison of the re-
forms in China and in the ex-Soviet bloc.
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that they are not deterred from innovating by low to moderate tax rates.
As a result, there is a range of tax rates that are associated with similar
growth outcomes. When taxes and other disincentives to innovate be-
come high, high-quality entrepreneurs exit and the growth engine stalls.
We use our model economy to compute the capital income tax rate
chosen by the median voter and by a benevolent planner. We first show
that even when themedian voter is a worker, he chooses a tax rate on cap-
ital income on the flat region of the function relating the tax rate to the
growth rate. The reason for this choice is that workers benefit from
growth in wages that results from the innovation process and understand
that high taxes would severely reduce growth prospects.
Ourmodel implies that punitive tax rates are unlikely to be adopted for
extended periods of time in well-functioning democracies or, more gen-
erally, in political regimes whose decisionmakers value growthmore than
preserving the status quo or maintaining political control.2 The optimal
choicesmade by themedian voter in ourmodel generate a censored sam-
ple in which the observed variation in tax rates has a small impact on
growth. So the model is consistent with the absence of a strong correla-
tion between tax rates and growth that we observe in the data.One impor-
tant implication of themodel is that the lack of correlation between taxes
and growth is not a global property that holds for all tax rates, but rather
an artifact of the endogenous nature of taxation: tax rates that are highly
detrimental to the growth process are generally not implemented.
We relate our model to the recent work of Diamond and Saez (2011),
who argue that the optimal marginal income tax rate for high-income in-
dividuals is 73 percent. We argue that the Diamond-Saez calculation suf-
fers from an important shortcoming: it considers only the static effect of
taxation on current tax revenue. Implicitly, this calculation ignores dy-
namic effects, that is, changes in the growth rate resulting from changes
in tax rates. In ourmodel these dynamic effects are small and can be safely
ignored when tax rates are low. But it is exactly when tax rates are high, in
the range recommended by Diamond and Saez, that these dynamic ef-
fects become important.
There are three models consistent with our observation that tax rates
are uncorrelated with long-run growth rates: the neoclassical growth
model, the Lucas (1988) model, and the Jones (1999) model. In all three
models, capital income taxes or other disincentives to investment do not
affect the steady-state growth rate. In the neoclassical model, this rate is
2 The Swedish experience in the 1970s illustrates the impact of public discourse on tax
policy. Astrid Lindgren, a successful writer of children’s books, published a satirical story
about the adverse incentive effects of the punishingly high tax rates levied by Sweden.
Her story sparked a public debate that is generally credited with leading to the first elec-
toral defeat of the Social Democratic Party in 40 years and to the reform of the tax code.
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determined by the pace of exogenous technical progress.3 In the Lucas
model, the engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital. The
costs (forgone wages) and benefits (higher future wages) of this accumula-
tion are affected by income taxes in the same proportion. As a result, the
growth rate is independent of the income tax rate.4 In the semi-endogenous
growth model proposed by Jones, the externalities from the innovation
process are not strong enough to make growth sustainable. Sustained
growth is feasible only when the population grows, and the steady-state
growth rate is proportional to the growth rate of population. So taxes in-
fluence growth only through their effect on the determinants of popula-
tion growth.5
These models in our view have two shortcomings. First, they are incon-
sistent with the observation that modest improvements in the incentives
to invest, in economies with high disincentives to invest, can produce
large growth effects. Second, they imply that long-run growth rates re-
main constant even when tax rates approach 100 percent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review and update
the evidence on the empirical correlation between tax rates and growth
rates. In Section III, we present our model. In Section IV, we discuss the
model’s implications for the effects of taxes on growth. In Section V, we
analyze the capital income tax rates that the median voter and benevo-
lent social planner would choose. We also discuss the implications of
our model for the optimal income tax calculations proposed by Dia-
mond and Saez (2011). Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Empirical Evidence on Taxation and Growth
In this section, we briefly review and update the evidence on the correla-
tion between taxation and growth. We discuss evidence both from cross-
country studies and from US time-series analyses.
Cross-country studies.—Easterly and Rebelo (1993) study a cross section
of 125 countries for the period 1970–88. Their main finding is that the
correlation between various tax rate measures and growth performance
3 In the neoclassical model, taxes can affect growth through transition dynamics. How-
ever, versions of the neoclassical model in which these dynamics are important tend to im-
ply that the real interest rate takes implausibly high values. See King and Rebelo (1993) for
a discussion.
4 Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997) discuss var-
iants of the Lucas (1988) model that, for certain parameter configurations, produce a
small impact of taxes on long-run growth. These variants include models in which labor
supply is endogenous and physical capital is an input to human capital accumulation.
5 Arnold (1998) incorporates human capital accumulation into a Jones (1999) style
growth model. The resulting model generates sustained growth in the absence of popula-
tion growth. Since human capital accumulation is the growth engine of the economy,
Arnold’s model inherits the properties of the Lucas model in terms of the effects of taxa-
tion on growth.
268 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 130.060.065.097 on January 17, 2018 05:53:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
is surprisingly fragile. They show that, while it is possible to select spec-
ifications for which taxes are negatively correlated with growth, this cor-
relation is not robust to the inclusion of other controls or to changes in
the sample composition.
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) find no correlation between tax
rates and growth rates in their study of panel data for 18OECD countries.
Similarly, Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) find no correlation be-
tween growth rates and the changes in marginal income tax rates that
have been implemented in OECD countries since 1975.
US time-series analyses.—Stokey and Rebelo (1995) argue that it is hard
to detect a negative growth impact of the rise in income tax rates imple-
mented in the United States after World War II. Before the Sixteenth
Amendment was approved in 1913, theUSConstitution severely restricted
the ability of the federal government to levy income taxes. Even after the
approval of the Sixteenth Amendment, federal income tax revenue re-
mained low, representing less than 2 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) between 1913 and 1940. Federal income tax revenue as a percent-
age of GDP rose to 15 percent by the early 1940s. Despite this increase,
Stokey and Rebelo find that the average US growth rates before and after
World War II are not statistically different. These results were anticipated
by Harberger (1964), who observed that US growth rates have been in-
variant to changes in the tax structure.6
Jones (1995) makes the more general point that changes in policy var-
iables tend to be permanent, but growth rates tend to be stationary. In re-
lated work, Easterly et al. (1993) show that persistence across decades is
low for growth rates but high for policy variables. This finding suggests
that caution is needed in attributing high growth rates to good policies,
such as low tax rates.
In recent work, Romer and Romer (2010, 2014) use the “narrative rec-
ord” on the motivation of tax policy changes in the postwar period to
identify changes that are exogenous, in the sense that they are not a re-
sponse to the growth prospects of the economy. Their paper focuses on
the short-run effect of taxes on output. They find that, in the postwar pe-
riod, a tax increase of 1 percent of GDP implies a 3 percent fall in output.
Importantly, the authors assume in their empirical work that permanent
changes in taxes affect output only temporarily and have no impact on
the long-run growth rate of the economy.7
6 We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that, by coincidence, other forces offset
exactly the effects of the tax hikes implemented in the postwar period, leaving the growth
rate unchanged.
7 See Mertens and Ravn (2014) for additional evidence on the short-run effect of taxa-
tion based on Romer and Romer (2010) shocks, as well as a discussion of the related liter-
ature.
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Revisiting the correlation between taxation and growth.—To revisit and up-
date the empirical work on taxation and growth, we use the method pro-
posed by Mendoza et al. (1994) to construct measures of tax rates on
capital and labor income for OECD countries for the period 1965–2010.
The first two columns of table 1 report results for cross-sectional re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of
real per capita GDP. The independent variables are our labor and capital
tax rate measures. As column 1 shows, neither labor nor capital income
taxes have a statistically significant impact on growth. Column 2 includes
controls commonly used in the growth literature (see, e.g., Barro 2012).8
Here, too, the tax variables are statistically insignificant.
The second two columns of table 1 show the results for panel regres-
sions using 5-year growth rates and 5-year averages of the independent
variables. All regressions have time and country fixed effects. Column 1
shows that the coefficients on both tax variables are statistically signifi-
cant. However, the sign of the labor income tax rate is positive. Once
we include controls (col. 4), the coefficients on labor and capital taxes
become insignificant.9
TABLE 1
Cross-Section and Panel Regressions
Cross-Section Regression Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor income tax .80
(1.55)
.44
(2.30)
.15
(.06)
2.05
(.09)
Capital income tax 21.90
(2.93)
3.44
(3.74)
2.09
(.03)
2.06
(.03)
Controls No Yes No Yes
R2 .04 .56 .72 .82
Fixed effects Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 17 17 78 71
Source.—Barro-Lee data set, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mendoza et al.
(1994), OECD, Penn World Table, Piketty et al. (2014), and the World Bank.
Note.—Date ranges: 1981–2010 for the cross-sectional regressions and
1965–2010 for the panel regressions. Countries in the sample are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Dependent variable is the
growth rate of real, per capita GDP.
8 These variables are the logarithm of lagged per capita GDP, 1/life expectancy at birth,
the logarithm of fertility, the investment share in GDP, male and female school years, the
government consumption share in GDP, the openness ratio, and the inflation rate.
9 One concern with these regressions is that changes in tax rates might be driven by the
economy’s growth prospects. In the Appendix, we explore two approaches to address this
endogeneity problem.
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We interpret the weight of the evidence gathered so far and our updated
results as suggesting that there is no strong association between the tax
rates adopted by different countries and their growth performance. This
body of evidence is consistent with the possibility that taxes might have
important level effects or create large deadweight losses. Higher tax rates
might, for example, induce agents to work less, as emphasized by Prescott
(2004), or to reallocate effort frommarket activities towardhomeproduc-
tion, as emphasized by Sandmo (1990). But the evidence is inconsistent
with the implication, shared bymany endogenous growthmodels, that the
observed changes in capital and labor taxes have large growth effects.10
III. Model
We consider a Romer (1990) style model in which growth is driven by in-
novation that expands the variety of intermediate inputs. Agents choose
whether to be workers or entrepreneurs, as in Lucas (1978). We focus
our analysis on the effect of capital income taxes on the growth rate of
the economy.
Importantly, we assume that agents have different entrepreneurial abil-
ity and that this ability follows a Pareto distribution. As we discuss below,
this assumption is consistent with evidence that the right tail of the US
income distribution is well described by the Pareto distribution (see, e.g.,
Diamond and Saez 2011). It is also consistent with the presence of right
skewness in the cross-sectional distribution of profits from innovation, re-
turns to entrepreneurship, and research productivity.11 Our assumption
that ability is a key driver of skewness in economic performance is moti-
vated by the work of Keane andWolpin (1997) andHuggett, Ventura, and
Yaron (2011), who find that differences in individual ability are a key
source of heterogeneity in economic outcomes.12
10 See Barro (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Rebelo (1991), and Stokey and Rebelo
(1995) for examples of models that share this implication.
11 Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) document the presence of skewness in the
returns to entrepreneurial activity. Scherer (1998) and Grabowski (2002) show that a small
number of firms account for a disproportionate fraction of the profits from innovation.
Bertran (2003), Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel (2003), Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005),
and Silverberg and Verspagen (2007) show that the distribution of patent values and pat-
ent citations is highly skewed. Hall et al. show that almost half of all patents receive zero or
one citation and less than 0.1 percent of total patents receive more than 100 cites. Lotka
(1926) and Cox and Chung (1991) show that the distribution of scientific publications per
author is skewed. Redner (1998) finds similar results for the distribution of citations to sci-
entific papers.
12 Recent papers that consider entrepreneurial ability as a major source of heterogeneity
include Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2014).
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A. Production
Final-good producers.—Final-good producers operate a constant-returns-
to-scale production function that combines labor (L) with a continuum
of measure n of intermediate goods (xi):
Y 5 La
ðn
0
x12ai di:
These final-good producers maximize after-tax profits, which are given
by
pf 5 L
a
ðn
0
x12ai di 2
ðn
0
pixidi 2 wL
 
ð1 2 tÞ,
where pi is the price of intermediate good i, w is the wage rate, and t is
the capital income tax rate. Both pi and w are denominated in units of
the final good. The first-order conditions for this problem are
pi 5 ð1 2 aÞLax2ai , (1)
w 5 aLa21nx12ai : (2)
The value of p f is zero in equilibrium. For convenience, we normalize
the number of final-goods producers to one.
Intermediate good producers/innovators.—Innovators own permanent pat-
ents on the production of intermediate goods. Each unit of the interme-
diate good, xi, is produced with h units of the final good. The after-tax
profit flow, pi, generated by each new good is given by
pi 5 pi 2 hð Þxið1 2 tÞ: (3)
Since all producers choose the same price and quantity, we eliminate
the subscript i in what follows. Equations (1) and (3) imply that the op-
timal price and quantity produced by the innovator are
p 5
h
1 2 a
, x 5 L
ð1 2 aÞ2
h
 1=a
: (4)
The maximal after-tax profit per patent is given by
p 5 að1 2 aÞð22aÞ=ah2ð12aÞ=aLð1 2 tÞ: (5)
When we optimize the use of intermediate goods in the production of
final goods, we obtain a reduced-form production function that is linear
in labor. This result, together with the fact that p is constant, implies that
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the wage rate does not depend on L. This property greatly simplifies our
analysis. Equations (2) and (4) imply that the equilibrium wage rate
equals
wt 5 ant
ð1 2 aÞ2
h
 ð12aÞ=a
: (6)
For future reference, we note that this equation implies that the wage
rate grows at the same rate as nt.
B. Government
The government rebates tax revenue back to agents in a lump-sum man-
ner. Profits gross of taxes are ðntp 1 p f Þ=ð1 2 tÞ. Tax revenue is given by
tðntp 1 p f Þ=ð1 2 tÞ. The budget constraint of the government is
Tt 5 t
ntp 1 p
f
1 2 t
,
where Tt denotes lump-sum transfers to the agents in the economy.
C. The Agent’s Problem
The economy is populated by H infinitely lived agents with identical
preferences. Agents differ in their entrepreneurial ability, a, which fol-
lows a cumulative distribution G(a). To simplify, we assume that individ-
uals with identical ability have the same initial stock of patents and that
all agents have zero initial bondholdings. Under these assumptions, the
only source of heterogeneity in the economy is the agent’s ability.
The utility of an agent with entrepreneurial ability a, U(a), is given by
U ðaÞ 5
ð∞
0
e2rt
CtðaÞ12j 2 1
1 2 j
dt, (7)
where Ct(a) denotes the agent’s consumption.
In each period, agents choose whether to work in the final-goods sector
and receive the real wage rate, wt, or become innovators. An agent with
ability a who becomes an entrepreneur invents dant new goods and ob-
tains a permanent patent on these inventions.13
The budget constraint of an agent with ability a is given by
_btðaÞ 5 rtbtðaÞ 1 wtltðaÞ 1 mtðaÞpt 1 ptf =H 2 CtðaÞ 1 Tt=H , (8)
13 We describe in the Appendix an alternative decentralization in which R&D firms hire
innovators in competitive labor markets. The resulting allocations are identical to those in
this model.
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and
lim
t→∞
e2∫
t
0 rsdsbt að Þ 5 0,
where bt(a) denotes the agent’s bondholdings and rt the real interest rate.
The variable lt(a) is equal to one if the agent chooses to be a worker in
period t and zero otherwise. The variable mt(a) denotes the number of
patents owned by an agent with entrepreneurial ability a at time t. The
law of motion for mt(a) is given by
_mt að Þ 5 dant 1 2 ltðaÞ½ : (9)
This equation implies that workers receive no new patents, while innova-
tors increase in the stock of patents they hold. As is common in this class
of models, there is an externality in the sense that, the larger the value of
nt, the easier it is to invent new goods. This externality is essential tomake
sustained growth feasible.
The model generates surprisingly complex borrowing and lending dy-
namics, which we describe in the Appendix.14 But since preferences are
consistent with Gorman aggregation, the growth rate of the economy is
independent of these borrowing and lending dynamics.
Occupational choice and equilibrium.—We show in the Appendix that the
equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a threshold rule. Agents
with ability a ≥ a* always work as entrepreneurs, while the rest always
work in the final-goods sector. So the number of workers in the final-good
sector is given by
L 5 HGða*Þ (10)
and the growth rate and real interest rate are constant. Thus, the patent’s
value V is
V 5
p
r
:
The threshold ability a* that makes agents indifferent between being a
worker and being an entrepreneur is given by15
a*dnt
p
r
5 wt : (11)
14 These dynamics arise because, depending on the initial patent holdings and occupa-
tional choices, some agents have incomes growing faster or slower than the aggregate
economy’s growth rate. In the limit, income growth for all agents converges to the growth
rate of the economy.
15 There is evidence that income prospects and taxation influence career choices. For
example, Philippon and Reshef (2012) show that, when finance was heavily regulated,
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The number of varieties in the economy, nt, evolves according to
_nt 5 dHnt
ð∞
a*
aGðdaÞ:
We show in the Appendix that the growth rate of the economy, g, coin-
cides with the growth rate of nt,
g 5 dH
ð∞
a*
aGðdaÞ: (12)
Since all agents face the same real interest rate, their consumption grows
at the same rate, which coincides with the growth rate of the economy, g.
The first-order conditions for the consumer problem imply
r 5 r 1 jg : (13)
Combining equations (5), (6), (10), (11), (12), and (13), we obtain
the following equation, which determines a*:
dH ð1 2 aÞa*Gða*Þð1 2 tÞ 5 r 1 jdH
ð∞
a*
aGðdaÞ: (14)
Once we obtain the value of a*, we can compute the growth rate of the
economy using equation (12).
IV. The Effect of Taxes on Growth
In order to study the effect of taxes on growth, we need to specify the dis-
tribution of entrepreneurial ability, G(a). Our choice is guided by the work
of Diamond and Saez (2011), which shows that the right tail of the US in-
come distribution follows a Pareto distribution. Since entrepreneurial in-
come is proportional to ability, our model is consistent with the evidence
provided by Diamond and Saez.
Given this distributional assumption, the growth rate of the economy
is given by
g 5 dH
k
k 2 1
ak a*ð Þ12k , (15)
where k is the shape parameter, a is the lower bound of the Pareto distri-
bution, and a* satisfies (14), which in turn can be written as
profits and labor compensation were low. As a result, high-skill individuals did not work in
the financial industry. Deregulation led to higher profits and wages, attracting high-skill
individuals to finance. Cullen and Gordon (2007) use US individual tax return data to
show that differences in tax rates on business vs. wage income have large effects on the
choice to become an entrepreneur.
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ð1 2 aÞa* 1 2 a
a*
 kh i
ð1 2 tÞ 5 j k
k 2 1
ak a*ð Þ12k
 
1
r
dH
: (16)
From these last two equations it follows that the effect of a tax change
on the growth rate of the economy is given by
dg
dt
5
2 r 1 jgð Þ
1 2 t
1
j 1 ð1 2 tÞð1 2 aÞv
 
, (17)
where v is
v 5 1 1
1
k
a*
a
 k
21
 
: (18)
Comparing a heterogeneous- and homogeneous-ability economy.—In order to
isolate the role of heterogeneity in ability in our model, it is useful to
compare an economy with heterogeneous ability with one in which abil-
ity is homogeneous (a 5 1 for all agents). In the homogeneous-ability
economy, all agents are indifferent in equilibrium between being work-
ers and being entrepreneurs, so the free-entry condition into the entre-
preneurial sector is
dntp
r
5 wt ,
and the growth rate of the economy is given by
g 5
dH ð1 2 aÞð1 2 tÞ 2 r
ð1 2 aÞð1 2 tÞ 1 j ,
implying that the effect of a tax change on the growth rate of the econ-
omy is given by
dg
dt
5
2 r 1 jgð Þ
1 2 t
1
j 1 ð1 2 tÞð1 2 aÞ
 
: (19)
Consider two economies, one with heterogeneous ability and the other
with homogeneous ability. To simplify the comparison, suppose that the
two economies have the same structural parameters, a and r, and the
same tax rate, t. Moreover, the size of the population in each economy
is such that they both grow at the same rate g.
Comparing equations (17) and (19), we find that the difference in the
impact of taxation on growth on the two economies results from v. When
k is finite, the value of a* is greater than a since, otherwise, there would
276 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 130.060.065.097 on January 17, 2018 05:53:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
be no workers or final-goods production, and patents would have no value.
Since a* > a, the value of v is greater than one. This property implies that
the impact of taxation on growth is always smaller in the heterogeneous-
ability model than in the homogeneous-ability model.
As we discuss in the introduction, the intuition for this result is that in
the heterogeneous-ability economy, the marginal innovator is much less
productive than the average innovator. So the exit of the marginal entre-
preneurs in response to a tax rise has a smaller growth effect than in the
homogeneous-ability economy, where the marginal innovator is as pro-
ductive as the average innovator.
Numerical example.—We use a numerical example to illustrate the ef-
fects of changes in the capital income tax rate in economies with homo-
geneous and heterogeneous ability. The following parameterization is
shared by both economies. We set the labor share in the production of
final goods to 60 percent (a5 0.60). We assume that j5 2 and we choose
r 5 0.01, so that the annual real interest rate in an economy with no
growth is 1 percent. Without loss of generality, we normalize d and h to
one. Finally, in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous cases, we
choose the value of H so that, when t5 0.3, the growth rate of the econ-
omy is 2 percent per year. This value of t corresponds to the average cap-
ital income tax rate in the United States, computed as the tax revenue di-
vided by the base. We normalize the value of a to one and choose k5 1.5.
This choice of k implies that the right tail of the income distribution im-
plied by the model is the same as that estimated by Diamond and Saez
(2011) for the US economy.
The first panel of figure 1 shows the effect of changes in t on the
growth rate of the two economies. In the homogeneous-ability model,
the growth rate of the economy is approximately linear in t. The growth
rate ranges from 2.9 percent when t5 0 to zero when t5 0.87. Doubling
the capital income tax rate from 30 to 60 percent halves the growth rate
from 2 percent to 1 percent. Higher taxes reduce the incentives to inno-
vation, reducing the number of entrepreneurs. Since all agents in the
economy are equally good at being entrepreneurs, this reduction has
a large impact on the rate of growth.
In the heterogeneous-abilitymodel, the growth rate is a nonlinear func-
tion of the tax rate. The growth rate ranges from 2.2 percent when t 5 0
to zero when t 5 1. Doubling the tax rate from 30 to 60 percent reduces
the growth rate from 2 to 1.65 percent. This reduction is much smaller
than that implied by the homogeneous-ability model (from 2 to 1 per-
cent). The impact of taxation is highly nonlinear in the heterogeneous-
ability economy: increasing t from 60 to 79 percent reduces the growth
rate by as much as doubling t from 30 to 60 percent.
The second panel of figure 1 depicts the fraction of entrepreneurs in
thepopulation for different values of t. In thehomogeneous-abilitymodel,
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this fraction ranges from 15 percent when t 5 0 to zero when t 5 0.87.
The strong, negative effect of taxes on the number of entrepreneurs is
at the core of the homogeneous-agents model’s large impact of taxation
on growth. In contrast, in the heterogeneous-ability model the fraction of
agents who choose to be entrepreneurs ranges from5.2 percent when t5
0 to zero when t 5 1. As t rises, the number of entrepreneurs declines
roughly linearly. But the impact on growth is highly nonlinear, because
the ability of the entrepreneurs who exit rises with t.
V. The Median Voter and the Social Planner
In this section, we analyze the capital income tax rates that the median
voter and a benevolent social planner would choose for our economy.
We conclude this section by relating our findings to the recent work
of Diamond and Saez (2011) on the optimal income tax rate for high-
income individuals.
A. Median Voter
We analyze an economy in which themedian voter is a worker and workers
own no patents at time 0. This case provides an upper bound on the tax
rate chosen by themedian voter for two reasons. First, if workers held some
patents, they would have less of an incentive to tax capital income. Second,
if the median worker was an entrepreneur, he would choose a lower tax
rate than a worker, since he receives capital income. A median voter who
is an entrepreneurmight choose a positive capital income tax rate in order
to redistribute income from high-ability to low-ability entrepreneurs.
A worker who is the median voter faces the following trade-off. On the
one hand, higher capital income taxes result in higher tax revenue and
higher lump-sum transfers in the short run, which benefits workers. On
the other hand, higher taxes lead to lower growth in wages in the long
run, which hurts workers.
Computing lifetime utility.—Since the consumption of both workers and
entrepreneurs grows at a constant rate, we can rewrite lifetime utility, de-
fined in equation (7), as
U 5
C 12j0
1 2 j
ð∞
0
exp 2r 1 ð1 2 jÞg½ tf gdt:
Assuming that ð1 2 jÞg < r, so that lifetime utility is finite, the value of U
is given by
U 5
C 12j0
rð1 2 jÞ 2 ð1 2 jÞ2g : (20)
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As we show in the Appendix, the time 0 consumption of workers is given
by
C0 5 w0 1
t
1 2 t
p
H
n0 1
r 2 g
r
pm0ðaÞ, a < a*: (21)
The trade-off faced by themedian voter is clear from equations (20) and
(21). A higher tax rate benefits workers since it increases the lump-sum
transfer they receive from the government (the term ½t=ð1 2 tÞðp=H Þn0
in eq. [21]). At the same time, a higher tax rate reduces the growth rate
and lowers utility by reducing the denominator in equation (20).
Median voter’s preferred tax rate.—The tax rate that maximizes the utility
of themedian voter for the parameters considered in Section III is 35 per-
cent. We find this result interesting for two reasons. First, this tax rate is
very close to the average capital income tax rate, computed as the tax rev-
enue divided by the base, which is roughly 30 percent. Second, the tax
rate chosen by the median voter suggests that democracies are unlikely
to choose tax rates that are very detrimental to growth prospects. When
t is equal to 35 percent, the economy grows at an annual rate of 1.95 per-
cent. Reducing the capital income tax rate to zero would increase the
growth rate only to 2.25 percent.
The fact that the median voter avoids implementing tax rates that lead
to poor growth prospects has important implications for the samples used
to study the empirical relation between taxation and growth. These sam-
ples are censored in the sense that they generally do not contain the full
range of values of t. Instead, they contain values of t on the flat region
of the function relating the tax rate to the growth rate,making the relation
between taxation and growth hard to detect.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of the initial consumption that would make
the median voter indifferent between an arbitrary tax rate t and the con-
sumption at the tax rate that maximizes his welfare. This figure illus-
trates that the effects of taxation on welfare are highly nonlinear, with
high rates of taxes being associated with low levels of welfare.
B. Social Planner
We now consider a social planner who chooses the tax rate to maximize a
weighted average of the utility of workers and entrepreneurs:
max
t
U 5
ð∞
a
ð∞
0
e2rt
CtðaÞ½ 12j21
1 2 j
dt
 	
GðdaÞ:
Recall that consumption of both workers and entrepreneurs grows at rate
g. The time 0 consumption of workers is given by equation (21). As we
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show in the Appendix, the time 0 consumption of entrepreneurs is given
by
C0 5 pn0
r 2 g
r
m0ðaÞ
n0
1
da
r
1
t
1 2 t
1
H
 
, a ≥ a*: (22)
For theparameters considered in Section III, the valueof t thatmaximizes
U is 31 percent. We choose the initial distribution of patents so that the
social plannerhas a strong redistributionmotive. As in the case of theme-
dian voter, we assume that workers do not own any initial patents. In ad-
dition, we distribute initial patents equally among the top 1 percent of en-
trepreneurs ranked by ability. The tax rate chosen by the social planner is
basically identical if the initial patents are distributed equally among the
top 2 or 3 percent of entrepreneurs ranked by ability.
Since the planner places a positive weight on the welfare of the entre-
preneurs, he always chooses a lower tax rate than the worker. The tax
rate selected by the social planner is remarkably close to the US capital
income tax rate.
C. Relation to the Modern Public Finance Literature
The tax rates chosen by the median voter and the social planner in our
model are much lower than the optimal tax rates advocated in the mod-
ern public finance literature. For example, Diamond and Saez (2011) ar-
FIG. 2.—Worker consumption equivalent (for median voter tax). Color version available
as an online enhancement.
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gue that the optimal income tax rate for high-income individuals is
73 percent. This high optimal tax rate results from the fact that high-
income individuals have a low elasticity of taxable income with respect
to the tax rate.
The Diamond-Saez calculation suffers from an important shortcom-
ing. It considers only the static effect of taxation on current tax revenue.
It ignores dynamic effects by implicitly assuming that the growth rate of
the economy is invariant with respect to the tax rate. In our model, these
dynamic effects are indeed small and can be safely ignored when tax
rates are low. But it is exactly when tax rates become high, in the range
recommended by Diamond and Saez (2011), that these dynamic effects
become significant.16
To see this problem, suppose that the government adopts very high
tax rates. The static effects of this action are positive for the workers:
their wage remains the same and they see a rise in the lump-sum trans-
fers they receive from the government. But the dynamic effects can be
disastrous for workers’ welfare, since higher taxes lead to a fall in the
growth rate of wages. We can use our model to illustrate how misleading
the focus on the static effects of taxation can be. Total pretax income in
the economy is given by
wtHGða*Þ 1 nt
pt
1 2 t
:
An increase in t leads to a rise in pretax income. To see this result, note
that the derivative of pretax income with respect to t is given by
wtHG
0ða*Þ da
*
dt
1 nt
d pt=ð1 2 tÞ½ 
dt
> 0: (23)
This expression reflects the fact that the wage rate is solely a function
of nt (see eq. [2]). Since nt is fixed in the short run, wt is not affected by
an increase in t.
As the tax rate rises, the ability threshold also rises (da*=dt > 0), and
some entrepreneurs become workers. So the first term in equation (23)
is positive. The second term is also positive because a rise in the number
of workers leads to a rise in pretax profits (see eq. [5]).
Since the short-run response of pretax income to the tax rate is posi-
tive, the tax rate that maximizes short-run tax revenue is 100 percent! A
16 Scheuer (2014) discusses another shortcoming of the Diamond-Saez calculation: it
implicitly assumes that tax-driven changes in the labor supply of high-income individuals
do not affect the productivity of other agents in the economy. Scheuer illustrates this issue
in a model in which the labor supplies of entrepreneurs and workers are complements, so
reductions in the entrepreneurial labor supply lead to a decline in the productivity of work-
ers. Our model embodies a natural source of complementarity between entrepreneurs and
workers.
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planner who considers only the static effects of taxation would choose a
high tax rate in order to redistribute income from the entrepreneurs to
the workers in order to equalize their marginal utility. But this choice
would be misguided since it ignores the impact of taxation on growth,
which is a key driver of welfare.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model in which the effects of taxation on
growth are highly nonlinear. Taxes have a small impact on long-run
growth when taxes rates and other disincentives to investment are low
or moderate. But as tax rates rise, the marginal impact of taxation on
growth also rises. This nonlinearity is generated by heterogeneity in en-
trepreneurial ability. In a low-tax economy, the ability of the marginal en-
trepreneur is relatively low. So increasing the tax rate leads to the exit of
low-ability entrepreneurs and to a small decline in the growth rate. In a
high-tax economy the ability of the marginal entrepreneur is relatively
high. So increasing the tax rate leads to the exit of high-ability entrepre-
neurs and a large decline in the growth rate.
Appendix
A. Endogeneity of Changes in Tax Rates
One concern with the regressions reported in table 1 is that changes in tax rates
might be driven by the economy’s growth prospects. We explore two approaches
to address this endogeneity problem. The first approach is to instrument for tax
rates with the lagged debt-GDP ratio. This approach is motivated by the observa-
tion that tax rate increases often result from the need to service the public debt.
For example, the tax hikes implemented by many countries after World War II
were not a reaction to their growth prospects. Instead, they resulted from the
need to service the debt accumulated during the war years. We report the results
from using this approach in table A1.17 In all cases, we find that the tax coeffi-
cients are insignificant.
In our second approach, we separate increases in tax rates from decreases in
tax rates. Themotivation for this approach is as follows. It is easy to find instances
in which policy makers reduce tax rates to improve poor growth prospects. But it
is much harder to find instances in which policy makers decide to raise taxes be-
cause growth prospects are too bright. So tax increases are likely to be more ex-
ogenous to growth prospects than tax decreases. Table A2 reports results for re-
gressions of the change in the growth rate on increases and decreases in tax
rates. Columns 1 and 2 show results without and with controls, respectively. In
both cases, the coefficients on tax variables are statistically insignificant.
17 Since we have only one instrument, the tax variables are included in the regression
one at a time.
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B. Solving the Agent’s Problem
We solve the agent’s problem in two steps. First, we maximize the agent’s wealth.
Second, we choose the optimal consumption path given the maximal level of
wealth. Integrating equation (8), we obtain
ð∞
0
e2∫
s
0 rj dj wsls að Þ 1 ms að Þps 1 p fs =H 1 Tt½ ds
5
ð∞
0
e2∫
s
0 rj dj Cs að Þ½ ds,
(A1)
where the left-hand side is the wealth of the agent and the right-hand side is the
TABLE A2
Panel Regressions
Regression
(1) (2)
Increase in labor income tax .12
(.24)
.18
(.27)
Increase in capital income tax 2.08
(.08)
2.12
(.09)
Decrease in labor income tax .08
(.26)
.23
(.23)
Decrease in capital income tax 2.25
(.20)
2.19
(.24)
Controls No Yes
R2 .69 .78
Fixed effects Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 63 59
Note.—Dependent variable is the change in the growth
rate of real, per capita GDP.
TABLE A1
Panel Regressions
Regression
(1) (2)
Labor income tax 2.26
(.45)
Capital income tax 2.14
(.25)
Controls Yes Yes
R2 .04 .13
Fixed effects Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes
Instrument Lagged debt/GDP Lagged debt/GDP
Observations 70 70
Note.—Dependent variable is the growth rate of real, per capita GDP.
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present value of the agent’s consumption. The wealth maximization problem
can then be written as
max
ð∞
0
e2∫
s
0 rj dj wsls að Þ 1 ms að Þps 1 pfs=H 1 Tt½ ds,
subject to equation (9). The Hamiltonian for this problem is
H 5 wtlt að Þ 1 mt að Þpt 1 pft =H 1 Tt 1 Vt að Þdant 1 2 lt að Þ½ ,
where Vt(a), the Lagrange multiplier associated with the law of motion for mt(a),
is the value of a patent. We proceed by analyzing the three first-order conditions
of the problem.
The first-order condition with respect to mt(a) is
_VtðaÞ 5 rtVtðaÞ 2 pt :
Solving this differential equation, we obtain
Vt 5
ð∞
t
pj e
2∫
j
t rsdsdj , (A2)
where we omit the subscript a because the value of Vt is the same for all agents.
Equation (A2) implies that the value of a patent for a new good is the discounted
value of the profit flow associated with the patent.
The first-order condition with respect to lt(a) implies that there is a threshold
ability, a*, that makes agents indifferent between being a worker and being an
entrepreneur:
a*dntVt 5 wt : (A3)
Agents with ability greater (lower) than a* choose to become entrepreneurs (work-
ers).
Finally, we note that the first-order condition for the consumer problem implies
_Ct að Þ
Ct að Þ
5
rt 2 r
j
: (A4)
Since all agents face the same real interest rate, their consumption grows at the
same rate. We denote this growth rate by g.
C. Consumption and Bondholdings
Worker’s consumption.—Consider an agent who is a worker, so ltðaÞ 5 1. The work-
er’s lifetime budget constraint is given by
ð∞
0
e2rt ½w0egt 1 m0 að Þp 1 Tt=H dt 5
ð∞
0
e2rt ½C0ðaÞegt dt: (A5)
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Recall that pt
f 5 0 and pt is constant. The lump-sum transfers received by the
worker are
Tt
H
5
t
1 2 t
p
H
n0e
gt : (A6)
Integrating equation (A5), we obtain the following equation for consumption at
time 0:
C0ðaÞ 5 w0 1
t
1 2 t
p
H
n0 1
r 2 g
r
pm0 að Þ, a < a*: (A7)
Since consumption grows at rate g, consumption at time t is given by
CtðaÞ 5 wt 1
t
1 2 t
p
H
nt 1
r 2 g
r
pm0 að Þe gt , a < a*: (A8)
Entrepreneur’s consumption.—Recall that the law of motion for the patents of an
entrepreneur with ability a is
_mtðaÞ 5 dant 5 dan0e gt , a ≥ a*:
Integrating this equation, we obtain
mtðaÞ 5 m0ðaÞ 1
dan0
g
e gt 2 1ð Þ, a ≥ a*: (A9)
The growth rate of mt(a) is given by
_mtðaÞ
mtðaÞ
5
g
1 1 e2gt gm0ðaÞ=ðdan0Þ 2 1½ 
, a ≥ a*:
This entrepreneur’s lifetime budget constraint is given by
ð∞
0
e2rt ½mt að Þp 1 Tt=H dt 5
ð∞
0
e2rt ½Ce0 að Þe gt dt, a ≥ a*: (A10)
Using equations (A6), (A9), and (A10), we obtain
Ce0 að Þ 5 p
r 2 g
r
 
m0ðaÞ 1
dan0
r
1
1
H
tn0
1 2 t
 
, a ≥ a*:
Since consumption grows at rate g, consumption at time t is given by
Cet ðaÞ 5 pnt
r 2 g
r
 m0ðaÞ
n0
1
da
r
1
1
H
t
1 2 t
 
, a ≥ a*,
_btðaÞ 5 p m0ðaÞ 1
da
g
nt 2 n0ð Þ
 
2 p m0ðaÞe gt 1
dant
r
 
, a ≥ a*:
(A11)
Borrowing and lending between agents.—The evolution of bondholdings for an
entrepreneur of ability a is given by
_bet ðaÞ 5 rbet ðaÞ 1 mtðaÞp 2 Cet ðaÞ 1 Tt=H :
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Using equation (A9) and the expression for consumption, we can rewrite the
evolution of the bondholding as
_bet ðaÞ 5 rbet ðaÞ 1 p m0ðaÞ 2 n0
da
g
 
1p n0da
1
g
2
1
r
 
2 m0ðaÞ
r 2 g
r
 
egt :
Integrating this equation, we obtain
bet ðaÞ 5 p m0ðaÞ 2
dan0
g
 
egt 2 1
r
:
This equation implies that entrepreneurs whose initial stock of patents is greater
(lower) than n0da=g are lenders (borrowers). Entrepreneurs with an initial stock
of patents equal to n0da=g have zero bondholdings. To understand these pat-
terns, it is useful to integrate equation (9):
mtðaÞ 5 m0ðaÞ 1
dan0
g
ðegt 2 1Þ, a ≥ a*:
Recall that the entrepreneur’s time t income is mt(a)p, where p is constant
(see eq. [5]). When m0ðaÞ 5 n0da=g , entrepreneurial income grows at the same
rate as consumption, so the entrepreneur does not need to use bond markets to
make his consumption stream consistent with his income stream. When m0 <
n0da=g , entrepreneurial income grows faster than g, and so entrepreneurs bor-
row against future income. When m0 > n0da=g , entrepreneurial income grows
slower than g, and so entrepreneurs lend in order to consume more than their
income in the future.
With the appropriate modification of the problem, we can also obtain the
bondholding of a worker (recall that the stock of patents held by workers is con-
stant over time):
btðaÞ 5 m0ðaÞp
egt 2 1
r
, a < a*:
When the initial stock of patents held by the workers is zero, their bond-
holdings are zero. When this stock is positive, workers’ income grows slower than
g, so workers lend in order to consume more than their labor income in the fu-
ture.
D. Alternative Decentralization
Consider the following alternative decentralization of the equilibrium. Compet-
itive R&D firms choose the fraction q(a) of workers with ability a in order to in-
vent new goods and sell the resulting patents. The problem for these firms is
max _mtV 2
ð∞
a
WtðaÞqðaÞda
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subject to
_mt 5
ð∞
a
dntaqðaÞda:
The first-order condition for this problem is
dntaV 5 WtðaÞ:
Since all workers can earn wt in the labor market, the only workers who seek
employment as entrepreneurs are those with a ≥ a*, where a* is given by
Wtða*Þ 5 wt ,
which we can rewrite as
dnta*V 5 wt :
Since V 5 p=r , this equation is equivalent to equation (A3).
E. Transitional Dynamics
1. Homogeneous-Ability Model
We first show that the homogeneous-ability model has no transitional dynamics:
p 5 að1 2 aÞð22aÞ=ah2ð12aÞ=aLð1 2 tÞ: (A12)
Equations (2) and (4) imply that the equilibrium wage rate is given by
wt 5 ant
ð1 2 aÞ2
h
 ð12aÞ=a
: (A13)
Recall that the value of a patent for a new good is
Vt 5
ð∞
t
pj e
2∫
j
t rsdsdj : (A14)
When there is an interior solution for the number of entrepreneurs, we have
dntVt 5 wt : (A15)
Using equation (A14) to compute _Vt , we obtain
_Vt 5
d
dt
ð∞
t
pj e
2∫t
j
rsdsdj :
Define
f ðt, jÞ 5 e2∫tj rsdspj :
Using Leibnitz’s rule we obtain
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_Vt 5
d
dt
ð∞
t
f ðt, jÞdj 5 2pt 1 rtVt : (A16)
Equation (A13) implies that wt=nt is constant. This property, together with equa-
tion (A15), implies that the value of the firm, Vt, is also constant. Given that _Vt 5
0, equation (A16) implies
Vt 5
pt
rt
: (A17)
Replacing pt and rt in equation (A17) for Vt,
Vt 5
að1 2 aÞð22aÞ=ah2ð12aÞ=aLtð1 2 tÞ
jdðH 2 LtÞ 1 r
:
Rearranging,
að1 2 aÞð22aÞ=ah2ð12aÞ=aLtð1 2 tÞ 5 V jdðH 2 LtÞ 1 r½ :
Differentiating with respect to time, using the fact that _Vt 5 0, we have
að1 2 aÞð22aÞ=ah2ð12aÞ=a _Ltð1 2 tÞ 5 2 _LtV jd:
This equation implies that _Lt 5 0, so Lt is constant. This property implies that
pt is constant (eq. [A13]). Equation (A17) implies that rt is constant. In sum, the
model has no transition dynamics.
2. Heterogeneous-Ability Model
The free-entry condition in the heterogeneous-ability model is
nda*t Vt 5 wt :
Since wt/nt is constant, we have
_a*t
a*t
1
_Vt
Vt
5 0:
Conjecture that _a* 5 0, so a*t 5 a*. The free-entry condition is
Vt 5
wt
nda*
:
We can now proceed as in the homogeneous-agent model and show that the real
interest rate and the growth rate are constant and that all equations are satisfied,
so that a constant value of a*t is indeed a solution.
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